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Not for the Sake of Punishment Alone:
Comments on Viewing the Criminal Sanction
Through Latter-day Saint Thought
Marguerite A. Driessen∗
. . . God himself atoneth for the sins of the world, to bring about
the plan of mercy, to appease the demands of justice, that God
1
might be a perfect, just God, and a merciful God also.
In his article, Viewing the Criminal Sanction Through Latter-day
Saint Thought, Professor Martin Gardner undertakes to examine
whether the doctrines and teachings of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints (hereinafter the “Church”) provide any insights on
2
the use of the criminal sanction in secular society. Given, as
Professor Gardner states, that “the criminal sanction entails the
3
purposeful infliction of suffering upon offenders,” a periodic review
of our society’s use of that sanction is a necessary and important
undertaking. Professor Gardner’s choice to conduct that review
through the lens of a particular religious dogma is both interesting
and unique. I was asked to comment on Professor Gardner’s article
4
presented at the LDS Perspectives on Law Conference. This
Comment will first provide a brief overview of the structure and
content of Professor Gardner’s article. Second, it will examine
∗ Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young
University. B.A., 1985, Brigham Young University; J.D., 1989, Stanford Law School. The
views expressed in this Comment do not necessarily reflect the views of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, the J. Reuben Clark Law School, or the Brigham Young University
Law Review.
1. Alma 42:15 (Book of Mormon).
2. See Martin R. Gardner, Viewing the Criminal Sanction Through Latter-day Saint
Thought, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 861; see also infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
3. Gardner, supra note 2, at 861.
4. The primary sources for my comments on Professor Gardner’s work are the LDS
scriptures and various commentaries on them. Scriptural analysis and doctrinal interpretation
are areas in which theologians spend their entire careers developing the necessary expertise to
speak authoritatively. I make no claims to having done so. Instead, I have evaluated Professor
Gardner’s article in light of my criminal justice training and experience and my own gospel
study.
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Professor Gardner’s analysis of Latter-day Saint (LDS) philosophies
and his application thereof as support for his ultimate conclusion,
which is that LDS teachings require punishment for violations of
5
secular laws “in order that justice be done.” This section
demonstrates that Professor Gardner has provided a thorough and
engaging discussion of retributivism and has outlined apparent
supports for retributivist justification of criminal punishment in LDS
philosophy. However, because of his failure to consider the
atonement of Jesus Christ in his analysis, Professor Gardner has
misapprehended the LDS scriptures and teachings he used to
support his conclusions.
The final section of this Comment posits that the conspicuous
absence of any discussion of the atonement of Jesus Christ and the
concomitant effects thereof on his scriptural analysis leave Professor
Gardner’s arguments ultimately unconvincing. Finally, it will use
LDS philosophies, with primary reliance on the doctrine of the
atonement, to explain why the support for Professor Gardner’s pure
retributivist theory of punishment just is not there.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF VIEWING THE CRIMINAL SANCTION
THROUGH LDS THOUGHT
The substance of Professor Gardner’s analysis is presented in two
sections: Section II, describing “just deserts” retributivism, and
6
Section III, discussing secular punishment and LDS thought. Both
of these sections will be addressed in turn.

5. Gardner, supra note 2, at 861.
6. Id. at 862, 871. Professor Gardner’s other sections include an introduction as
Section I and a conclusion as Section V. Id. at 861, 889. Professor Gardner also includes
Section IV, a discussion of the death penalty in light of LDS thought and his conclusions that
this particular punishment is not required under that dogma. Id. at 882–89. I found the
inclusion of this section unnecessary and somewhat distracting. This lengthy discussion,
comprising nearly one-third of his article, adds nothing to Professor Gardner’s thesis that LDS
philosophy supports a just deserts retributivist justification for punishment. In fact, this
discussion weakens Professor Gardner’s arguments by asserting several key propositions that
contradict his thesis.
Professor Gardner’s flawed propositions include admitting that retributivists require
punishment for wrongdoing but do not require any particular form of punishment to meet the
demands of justice. Id. at 883. He also admits that the just application of the death penalty
would require a degree of accuracy in measuring culpability that is simply not possible in our
secular courts. Id. at 884. Finally, Professor Gardner states that the finality and irrevocability of
the death penalty make it an inappropriate sanction for people who have been cautioned
against making judgments of other people. Id. at 887. Despite Professor Gardner’s statement
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A. The Recipe for “Just Deserts”

In Section II of his article, Professor Gardner provides an
explanation of and the underlying rationale behind “just deserts”
retributivism. This theory of retributivism, he writes, “considers
punishing offenders as intrinsically good, independent of any
7
beneficial consequences.” Under this view, those who violate the
law must be punished for that reason, and for that reason alone. For
those who embrace this philosophy, it would be improper to impose
punishment for any other reason—particularly utilitarian reasons
involving the good of civil society or even some other benefit for the
8
criminal himself. In fact, Professor Gardner states that “some desert
theorists might advocate punishing offenders even if the results of
9
such were socially detrimental.”
In this section of his article, Professor Gardner does a thorough
job presenting authority for just deserts retributivism. Beginning
10
with the writings of Immanuel Kant, working through those of
11
12
Herbert Morris and C.S. Lewis, and concluding finally with the

to the contrary, id. at 888, as will be discussed infra, each of these points is equally applicable
to other forms of secular punishment.
7. Id. at 862.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 863 (citing IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF
JUSTICE 100 (John Lodd trans., 1965)). Gardner describes Kant as a classic retributivist and
quotes Kant as stating that “punishment can never be used merely as a means to promote some
other good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but instead it must in all cases be
imposed on him only on the ground that he has committed a crime.” Id. at 863 (emphasis
added) (quoting KANT, supra, at 100).
11. See id. at 864 (citing Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in PUNISHMENT 74
(J. Feinberg & H. Gross eds., 1975)). Gardner cites Morris to argue that all people have a
“moral right to be punished for their criminal offenses,” which Morris argues stems from each
individual’s “right to be treated as a person.” Id.
12. See id. at 865 (citing C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in 6 RES
JUDICATAE 224 (1953)). Gardner presents Lewis’s critique of therapeutic models of
punishment as further support for just deserts retributivism. Id. Lewis acknowledges that
giving offenders their just deserts may have ancillary utilitarian effects and he sees no problem
with that. Id. at 866 n.15 (quoting Lewis, supra, at 225). However, to impose punishment for
any reason other than the “desert” would be wickedness. Id. Of import, Gardner cites Lewis to
make the point that the therapeutic model of punishment, which Lewis labels the
Humanitarian theory, misapprehends the concepts of mercy and justice by substituting mercy
for justice and thereafter leads to a system of forced therapy, regardless of desire, that is
inherently unmerciful. Id. at 867.
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14

thoughts of Herbert L. Packer and Michael S. Moore, Professor
Gardner establishes several salient aspects of the theory of just deserts
retributivism that he later seeks to support through LDS philosophy.
First, and most important, is the notion that every individual is a
15
person with the right to choose evil over good. As will be discussed,
infra, this first point is wholly consistent with mainstream LDS
philosophy.
Second, Professor Gardner presents the theory that stemming
from personhood and the right to choose evil is the right to be
punished commensurate with the evil that you do. That is to say,
society must punish the individual who commits crime, for failure to
do so is to deny that individual’s autonomy. After all, that person
made a deliberate choice to violate societal norms and to bring forth
the natural consequences of that choice. Therefore, the criminal has
16
a right to those consequences.
The final aspect of just deserts stems ultimately from Professor
Gardner’s second point: since the criminal has the right to be
punished, society cannot properly dilute, mitigate, or forgo due
punishment consistent with that right and with the demands of
17
justice. Thus, humanitarian goals aimed at rehabilitation, treatment,
or any other therapeutic models of crime and punishment are, at
18
best, misguided, and must not exist in a just society.
Professor Gardner has painstakingly presented these points and
has gleaned from them a clear, concise theory of just deserts
retributivism. It is this theory of retributivism that Professor Gardner
asserts is not just supported in LDS philosophy, but demanded by
13. See id. at 868 (citing HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION 53–88 (1968)). Gardner cites Packer’s example of a “good behavior pill” (that
removes all criminal propensities) that the government chooses to use instead of punishment to
illustrate Packer’s support for “the right to be bad” that is inherent in human autonomy. Id. at
868 (citing PACKER, supra, at 57–88).
14. See id. at 869 (citing Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 80, 81 (Leo Katz et al. eds., 1999)). Gardner cites Moore
to illustrate a different support for just deserts retributivism: the virtuous feelings of guilt and
desire to be punished each of us would have were we to commit the crime in question. Id.
(citing Moore, supra, at 81). Moore argues that we should trust those feelings and translate
the punishments we would imagine ourselves deserving in similar circumstances into the actual
punishment imposed on the real offender. Id. (citing Moore, supra, at 82).
15. Id. at 865–68.
16. Id. at 864–67.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 867–70.
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19

it. However, it is not at all clear that the theory of just deserts
20
retributivism is demanded by LDS doctrine. To the contrary, it
appears that LDS doctrine weighs in opposition to just deserts
retributivism.
B. LDS Thought on Secular Punishment
As illustrated above, in Section II of his article, Professor
Gardner described the theory of just deserts retributivism and
21
provided support for the rationale underlying it. In his next section,
“Secular Punishment and LDS Thought,” Professor Gardner
discusses elements of LDS doctrine that he argues support the
22
retributivist theory of punishment he previously described. In this
section, Professor Gardner gleans support from three sources:
scriptural references, statements of Church leaders, and an analysis of
23
the LDS beliefs regarding free agency and the premortal life. While
the particulars of Professor Gardner’s analysis will be discussed in my
Section II, infra, there are a few general observations regarding his
analysis of scriptural references that are worthy of mention.
First, Professor Gardner admits to the paucity of direct scriptural
24
references to the use of the secular criminal law. Indeed, his entire
scriptural support is limited primarily to a discussion of only two
25
sections of the Doctrine & Covenants. Professor Gardner freely
admits that even these scriptures can be interpreted to support a

19. See id. at 861, 889. Professor Gardner states that “Church doctrine provides a
unique foundation for the view that punishment is required in order that justice be done,” id.
at 861 (emphasis added), and then concludes that his presentation of the LDS perspective on
the criminal law “commits Latter-day Saints to strive for and uphold systems of criminal law
that do justice,” id. at 889 (emphasis added). As mentioned previously, Professor Gardner
does not address other purposes of punishment. That punishment for crime may be justified by
rehabilitative, deterrent, or other utilitarian purposes is not refuted in his article. In fact, an
early footnote acknowledges his belief that Latter-day Saints can, presumably consistent with
LDS doctrine, defend utilitarian purposes of punishment. See id. at 861 n.4. It was not
Professor Gardner’s intent to refute any other purpose of punishment. Rather, his goal was to
demonstrate that LDS philosophies specifically support a retributivist view of punishment.
20. This Comment will not critique retributivism generally, but rather will point out
areas in which LDS philosophy is inconsistent with it.
21. Gardner, supra note 2, at 862–70.
22. Id. at 871–81.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 871.
25. Id. at 871–74.
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utilitarian rationale rather than a retributivist one. As further
evidence of the dearth of direct scriptural references, this section is
extremely brief, comprising only three pages in a twenty-eight page
article. Finally, Professor Gardner’s approach to this analysis is quite
diffident because his interpretations of the scriptural passages are
stated not as conclusions, but as possibilities—making each step in
27
his analysis a tentative conditional rather than a finding.
Given the nature of the topic and the realities regarding resource
material to address it, these observations would ordinarily not be a
concern. In this instance, however, these observations align to point
out Professor Gardner’s analytical weakness: despite the admitted
limitations to his supporting references and the conclusions that may
be drawn therefrom, Professor Gardner confidently asserts that “[o]n
this view, it is essential that violators of the law be punished in order
28
to receive their just deserts.”
Professor Gardner’s remaining supports discussed in his Section
II do not suffer from these express limitations. However, for reasons
that will be discussed in my Section II, infra, his analysis in these
subjections also falls short of providing the support for retributivism
29
that Professor Gardner ultimately asserts.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF PROFESSOR GARDNER’S LDS SUPPORT FOR
RETRIBUTIVISM
A. The Misapprehension of LDS References
Given the foregoing discussion, Professor Gardner’s preface to
his discussion of LDS thought on secular punishment in which he
acknowledges the paucity of direct scriptural references to it is
particularly apt. I adopt his disclaimer as I initiate my own analysis.
The lack of direct scriptural references obviously makes authoritative
analysis difficult. Add to this difficulty the fact that it is scripture that

26. Id. at 871, 873.
27. See id. at 871–74. Note the number of times Professor Gardner states, in essence, “if
the scripture means this, then it supports a retributivist view.”
28. Id. at 874.
29. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text which illustrate that these sections
ultimately lead to the conclusion that the doctrine of free agency is central to LDS doctrine
and that with choice comes accountability; however, these sections do not lead to the
conclusion that “accountability” must be meted in a particular secular manner.
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must be analyzed, and the difficulty increases exponentially. Fully
acknowledging that sufficient holes and ambiguities exist in the texts
on these matters and that minds brilliant as well as reasonable could
differ, this section nevertheless resolves that, for the reasons that
follow, Professor Gardner’s interpretation of scripture and the
thoughts of Church leaders was simply wrong.
First, it appears that Professor Gardner identified the few existing
scriptural references to secular law and punishment and used them to
30
support a theory of punishment that he had already formed. It
would not be fair to say that he quoted the supporting passages out
of context and thereby misrepresented their meaning; however, it
would be fair to say that Professor Gardner missed the global or
overarching context in which all of these scriptures have been
presented and therefore misapprehended their meanings. For
example, Professor Gardner cites to verse 8 of section 134 of the
Doctrine & Covenants as authority for the position that LDS
31
doctrine supports retributivist principles. My reading of this passage
leads me to conclude that not only does it fail to support a
retributivist theory of punishment, but it also provides direct support
for utilitarian justifications. Verse 8 reads in part:
We believe that the commission of crime should be punished
according to the nature of the offense; that murder, treason,
robbery, theft, and the breach of the of the general peace, in all
respects, should be punished according to their criminality and
their tendency to evil among men, by the laws of that government in
which the offense is committed . . . .32

As clarified by the second clause, rather than arguing in favor of
retributivism, the first clause is a profession of a general belief that
punishments should be proportionate to the crimes for which they
are imposed. As I read it, the second clause is an attempt to clarify
that general belief with a specific example. This is illustrated by the
inclusion of the phrase “according to their criminality and their
30. It is clear—not just from Viewing the Criminal Sanction Through Latter-day Saint
Thought, but also from his other works—that Professor Gardner himself leans toward pure just
deserts retributivism. See Martin R. Gardner, The Right of Juvenile Offenders to be Punished:
Some Implications of Treating Kids as Persons, 68 NEB. L. REV. 182 (1989); Martin R.
Gardner, The Right to be Punished: A Suggested Constitutional Theory, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 838
(1981).
31. Gardner, supra note 2, at 871.
32. Doctrine & Covenants 134:8 (emphasis added).
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tendency to evil among men.” This phrase includes a limitation on
the degree of punishment and expresses a belief that unpunished
offenses lead others to lawlessness. Inherent in this language is a
desire to deter men from that tendency to evil—a utilitarian rationale
for punishment. The interpretation that Doctrine & Covenants 134:8
supports utilitarian purposes of punishment rather than retributivist
purposes is further supported by the third and final clause in this
verse which states, “and for the public peace and tranquility all men
should step forward and use their ability in bringing offenders
33
against good laws to punishment.” Professor Gardner acknowledges
that this clause is problematic for just deserts retributivism because it
“suggests utilitarian purposes of punishment” in providing a reason
for punishing offenders (furthering the causes of public peace and
34
tranquility) that is not punishment for its own sake. However, he
misses the true import of the adjective “good” modifying the “laws”
for which punishment is to be sought. We may certainly infer from
this clause that there is no obligation to bring offenders against bad
laws to punishment. Retributivists would argue that the violation of
the law requires punishment simply because the law was broken. As
long as the law exists, violations thereof will require punishment—
even if some consider the law to be unwise or unjust.
The conclusion that verse 8 does not support a retributivist
theory of punishment becomes more clear when it is read in
connection with verses 9 and 10, which Professor Gardner failed to
quote. Verse 8 does not describe how the Lord wants the members
of his Church to view all laws, it simply describes those laws the Lord
views as just. Verse 9 describes a category of laws the Church viewed
as unjust: laws mingling church and state that furthered the cause of
35
any particular religion over the interests of another. Verse 10
describes religious freedoms that the Church held paramount (the
freedom to deal with their own members without legal intrusion
regarding issues of fellowship and membership in good standing)
and described more laws that it would view as unjust (laws
permitting religious societies to place a member’s life, liberty, or
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. Gardner, supra note 2, at 871.
35. Doctrine & Covenants 134:9 (“We do not believe it just to mingle religious
influence with civil government, whereby one religious society is fostered and another
proscribed in its spiritual privileges, and the individual rights of its members, as citizens,
denied.”).
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property in jeopardy, or permitting them to inflict physical
36
punishments, or any punishments at all beyond excommunication).
Professor Gardner missed the significance of this larger context
because he limited his analysis to exclusively verse 8.
Professor Gardner also missed the broader context in his only
other scriptural reference, Doctrine & Covenants 42:84–86. These
verses describe certain offenses for which Latter-day Saints must
“deliver up” fellow members who commit crime to the secular law to
37
be punished. If you read nothing else, these passages appear to
support his conclusion that LDS philosophy supports just deserts
retributivism. However, when read with the whole of section 42, the
import of those three specific verses shifts.
Section 42 contains instructions to members of the Church for
dealing with each other, dealing with transgressors, and as a part of
38
that, dealing with lawbreakers. Specific transgressions are to be
dealt with in specified manners, with a couple of general
statements—those quoted by Professor Gardner—that those who
violate the secular laws should be left to those laws for punishment.
In isolation, those verses could be read as a demand that secular
justice be meted out. However, in context, those verses instead
appear to be counsel to the leaders of the Church to let the secular
law deal with secular criminals. When read with the rest of the
section, it seems that verse 8 is more of a jurisdictional limitation
39
than a moral imperative.
36. Verse 10 states,
We believe that all religious societies have a right to deal with their members for
disorderly conduct, according to the rules and regulations of such societies;
provided that such dealings be for fellowship and good standing; but we do not
believe that any religious society has authority to try men on the right of property or
life, to take from them this world’s goods, or to put them in jeopardy of either life
or limb, or to inflict any physical punishment upon them. They can only
excommunicate them from their society, and withdraw from them their fellowship.
Id. at 134:10.
37. Id. at 42:84–86.
38. See generally id. at 42:69–93 (the section heading states that the Prophet Joseph
Smith described this section as “embracing the law of the church”).
39. Although the language appears to state a command to “deliver” lawbreakers to the
secular authorities, the notion that this is a jurisdictional limitation is supported by Church
practice. Those who confess transgressions to ecclesiastical leaders do not report them.
Consider the case of Paul Turner who confessed to trying to kill his wife in 2001. News
accounts reported that his bishop encouraged him to turn himself in. LDS bishops to whom
the confessions are made honor the sanctity of the confessional and do not turn those who
confess over to the authorities. See Geoffrey Fattah, Guilty Plea in Poisoning, DESERET NEWS,
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Professor Gardner’s discussion of comments made by leaders of
the Church is more robust, but ultimately suffers from the same
problem affecting his scriptural analysis: misinterpretation due to
missed context. When Professor Gardner quotes Dallin H. Oaks, he
accurately recounts the words, but misses the context in which they
were presented and again misapprehends their meaning. He quotes
40
Elder Oaks and attributes to him an apparent retributivist position
based upon several passages of text in which Elder Oaks is actually
illustrating the distinction between man’s criminal law and the
41
Lord’s law of discipline for the members of the Church. However,
Elder Oaks is simply stating his opinion on the nature of the secular
law. He does not in those passages—nor in any other identifiable
source—adopt that view as his own, voice approval for it, or in any
way assert that LDS doctrine dictates that is the way it is supposed to
be.
Professor Gardner quotes Elder Oaks regarding people “feeling”
42
that justice has been done when the punishment fits the crime.
Given Elder Oaks’ subsequent discussion of the parable of the
mediator, it is clear that Professor Gardner makes too much of this
statement. People may not “feel” that justice has been done unless
the offender “receives what he deserves.” However, when the
demands of justice have been met, these people must be satisfied.
The creditor, having been paid by the intermediary, cannot demand
that the debtor suffer for his failure to be responsible, to pay on
43
time, or to pay from the debtor’s own pocket. The creditor’s or

Mar. 28, 2003, at A1. While a party’s willingness to confess to appropriate people outside of
the Church is relevant to whether that party’s repentance is sincere, its relevance is minimal in
terms of what ecclesiastical discipline the Church subsequently metes out.
40. See Gardner, supra note 2, at 876 (quoting DALLIN H. OAKS, THE LORD’S WAY
217 (1991), for the proposition that the admonition that “crime should be punished” is
grounded in the interest of doing justice).
41. See OAKS, supra note 40, at 216–17. Elder Oaks states that the laws of men have no
theory of mercy and take no account of the atonement. It is “justice” that requires
punishment. It is this “justice” that Elder Oaks urges us to look beyond in seeking to follow
the Lord’s way instead of man’s way. Id.
42. Gardner, supra note 2, at 876–77. Note that in the passage provided by Professor
Gardner he has run together statements from two different paragraphs. The new paragraph
begins: “People generally feel . . . .” See OAKS, supra note 40, at 216–17.
43. See OAKS, supra note 40, at 219; THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY
SAINTS, GOSPEL PRINCIPLES MANUAL 75–77 (1997) [hereinafter GOSPEL PRINCIPLES]
(containing Boyd K. Packer’s parable of the Mediator).
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anyone else’s feelings that the delinquent debtor may have gotten
significantly less than he deserved are simply irrelevant.
In fact, despite the few various references to LDS scriptures, it
does not appear that Church practice recognizes an obligation to
turn over to secular authority those who transgress the secular law.
Repentance, for example, requires confession to the Lord and, if the
44
sins are serious, confession to appropriate priesthood authority. It
also requires confession and the making of restitution to any person
45
the transgressor may have harmed. It does not require confession to
the sovereign whose laws the transgressors may have also violated.
It is true that someone under a criminal justice sentence is not
generally baptized until the sentence has been satisfied. It is also true
that the commission of crime may result in a member of the Church
being disfellowshipped or excommunicated. However, it is not
required that a transgressor suffer a criminal penalty. Rather, he or
she need only be willing to be subject to the secular authority.
Otherwise, repentance would require not simply that you confess, for
example, to stealing from a neighbor, but that the neighbor report
you to the police. It would require not only that you turn yourself
over to the police, but that they arrest you, and it would require that
the prosecutor charge you. In the face of these charges you must not
only plead guilty, but the judge must impose a penalty, and that
penalty must be commensurate with what you did in order for your
“restitution” to be complete. Yet it is not the case that a person’s
repentance is dependant upon whether his victim seeks redress at the
law and whether the secular authorities exact “retribution” under
that law.
However, that is exactly what would be required under a just
deserts recidivist theory of punishment. If secular punishment had to
be meted out for violations of secular law as a condition of
repentance, church action would be contingent upon whether all the
parties with discretion to affect the secular decision chose to follow
through with the infliction of a criminal penalty. I will state here
emphatically that such is not the case. The Church believes in being

44. See GOSPEL PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at 124–25. This confession would be made
to one’s bishop or branch president.
45. Id.
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46

subject to the civil law, but espouses no particular requirements
regarding what the content of that law must be.
The final prong of Professor Gardner’s argument that LDS
philosophy supports just deserts retributivism is contained in his
discussion of the LDS doctrines of free agency and the war in heaven
47
that resulted from Lucifer’s attempt to destroy that agency. The
basic conclusion is that each of us, our spirits, or more particularly,
our intelligences, are eternal, separate entities. Consequently, we are
48
free to choose our own paths. Because of that freedom, we are each
accountable for our actions and to each individual belongs the praise
49
or blame that should attach to those actions.
These points are clearly made and firmly supported through the
LDS scriptural references and commentaries thereto that Professor
Gardner presents. Where his argument loses cohesion is in his
subsequent conclusion that these doctrines parallel Michael Moore’s
retributivist notion that offenders should be punished by the secular
law because our divine spirits feel guilty for our misdeeds. Professor
Gardner inexplicably jumps from the existence of agency to the
necessity of punishment.
Ironically, this is the opposite of LDS views on eternal life and
exaltation. The LDS view of the plan of salvation centers around
natural consequences for our actions here on earth and around the
notion that our misdeeds, rather than bring upon us particular
50
punishments in the hereafter, cut us off from specified blessings.
Ultimately, even these consequences can be eliminated through the
atoning sacrifice of Jesus Christ.
III. RETRIBUTIVISM AND THE ATONEMENT IN LDS THOUGHT
Professor Gardner’s failure to address the LDS doctrine of the
atonement in his analysis is his argument’s greatest weakness. If not
for the atonement and its centrality to LDS doctrine, there are
several points of textual interpretation presented in Professor
46. See Articles of Faith 12 (Pearl of Great Price).
47. Gardner, supra note 2, at 877–81.
48. Id. at 879.
49. Id. The purpose of Professor Gardner’s discussion of the premortal existence and of
the war in heaven is to illustrate the importance of our free agency. Id. at 879–80.
50. Doctrine & Covenants 130:20–21. (“There is a law, irrevocably decreed in heaven
before the foundations of this world, upon which all blessings are predicated—And when we
obtain any blessing from God, it is by obedience to that law upon which it is predicated.”).
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Gardner’s analysis, and subsequently challenged in this Comment,
upon which reasonable minds could arrive at different conclusions.
However, an understanding of the doctrine of the atonement
militates in favor of interpreting texts and resolving any ambiguities
more consistently with this Comment than with Professor Gardner’s
thesis.
This section discusses how these same references can be read and
interpreted in a broader context. I do not just mean that the
additional words, paragraphs, or pages in which the specific scriptural
texts were embedded can and should be read more broadly. Rather,
I mean that these sources should be read in light of the overarching
context in which all of those words were written: the Lord’s plan of
51
salvation.
LDS scriptures tell us the Lord’s purpose for mortality: “For
behold, this is my work and my glory—to bring to pass the
52
immortality and eternal life of man.” We have been put on this
earth to be tested, and if we are up to the test we will be exalted and
thereby achieve that immortality and eternal life:
25 And we will prove them herewith, to see if they will do all
things whatsoever the Lord their God shall command them;
26 And they who keep their first estate shall be added upon; and
they who keep not their first estate shall not have glory in the same
kingdom with those who keep their first estate; and they who keep
their second estate shall have glory added upon their heads for ever
and ever.53

These passages help explain what task we are here to do, but they do
not tell us how we can accomplish it. The answer to that is the
cornerstone of the plan of salvation; and the absence of any adequate
discussion of it in Professor Gardner’s essay is its primary flaw. This
cornerstone is the atonement of Jesus Christ.

51. The phrase “plan of salvation” refers to all those doctrines in the LDS philosophy
that collectively purport to describe where we come from, why we are here, where we go after
death, and, when possible, how it is all brought about. See GOSPEL PRINCIPLES, supra note 43,
at 301–05 (providing a brief summary of the plan of salvation as an introduction to the topic
of exaltation—the goal of that plan).
52. Moses 1:39 (Pearl of Great Price).
53. Abraham 3:25–26 (Pearl of Great Price).
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Because we all fall short of perfection, “by the law no flesh is
54
justified . . . .”
However, notwithstanding our errors and
shortcomings, Christian faiths espouse the general belief that we may
all find redemption through the atonement of Jesus Christ. At the
risk of gross oversimplification, the doctrine of the atonement
provides that Jesus Christ paid the price for our sins such that we
55
may be spared having to do so. Christ suffered the penalty for our
sins to satisfy the demands of divine justice. And, of paramount
importance to our discussion here, those who partake of the
atonement by repenting of their sins will not have to personally
suffer the consequences for those sins because the Savior will have
56
already done so. This basic doctrine is central to the beliefs of the
57
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
Professor Gardner provides great detail of the LDS belief of the
premortal existence and the war in heaven that was fought over the
58
free agency of humankind. He relies upon the doctrine of free
agency and the resulting individual accountability to support a right
to be punished under the law, and thus, as support for an LDS belief
that justice requires that each individual offender must be punished
59
under the law. Given his detailed discussion of agency, it is
surprising that Professor Gardner fails to mention that free agency is
not an end unto itself, but merely a means to an end in LDS
philosophy. We are not here simply to make choices (and suffer the
attendant consequences). We are here to see if, given the freedom to
60
choose, we will make the right choices.
It is this freedom to choose coupled with the inevitability of our
making wrong choices that make it necessary for us to have a Savior
and an atonement. And this atonement, the cornerstone of the LDS

54. 2 Nephi 2:5 (Book of Mormon).
55. See GOSPEL PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at 71–74; see also OAKS, supra note 40, at
217–19. Of course, I make no pretense of providing a thorough explication of the LDS
doctrine of the atonement. It is my hope only to describe it clearly and accurately enough for
discussion in this context.
56. See GOSPEL PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at 71–74.
57. The atonement is the means by which we have come to resolve the justice-mercy
paradox. The apparent paradox derives from the fact that both justice and mercy are eternal
principles, and neither can be satisfied at the expense of the other. See Alma 42:13–26 (Book
of Mormon).
58. See Gardner, supra note 2, at 877–81.
59. Id.
60. See Abraham 3:25 (Pearl of Great Price).
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view of the plan of salvation, is the antithesis of Professor Gardner’s
just deserts retributivism: because of the atonement, no matter what
wrongs we commit (with limited exceptions), we will not personally
have to suffer the penalty or pay the price for our sins if we properly
61
repent.
It is another facet of LDS doctrine that in addition to being
62
tested we are here to learn. And we believe that what we learn here
will accompany us in the world to come and will determine our place
63
in that world. Consequently, LDS doctrine teaches that there is no
division of nor difference between spiritual teachings and laws and
64
those that are temporal. Anything that may appear to be temporal
65
must have a spiritual basis. Thus, what the Lord provides for us
here must inevitably lead us to the truth of his gospel, and ultimately
back to him. At the very least, the Lord’s teachings will not interfere
with our ability to achieve exaltation. Because of its tendency to deny
the possibility of an atonement, just deserts retributivism, as
described by Professor Gardner, cannot claim the support from LDS
doctrine that he purports to have found. There are several steps to
reaching this conclusion, but they are not complicated and are set
forth below.

61. LDS scripture asserts that denying “the Holy Ghost when it once has had place in
you” is an unpardonable sin, and that murdering “against the light and knowledge of God” is
placed in the same context, though not explicitly labeled “unpardonable.” See Alma 39:5–6
(Book of Mormon).
62. See, e.g., 2 Nephi 2:14 (Book of Mormon) (“And now my sons, I speak unto you
these things for your profit and learning . . . .”), 4:15 (“For my soul delighteth in the
scriptures, and my heart pondereth them, and writeth them for the learning and the profit of
my children.”).
63. See Doctrine & Covenants 130:18 (“Whatever principal of intelligence we attain
unto in this life, it will rise with us in the resurrection.”).
64. The Lord teaches this when he says:
Wherefore, verily I say unto you that all things unto me are spiritual, and not at any
time have I given unto you a law which was temporal; neither any man, nor the
children of men; neither Adam your father, whom I created. Behold, I gave unto
him that he should be an agent unto himself; and I gave unto him commandment,
but no temporal commandment gave I unto him, for my commandments are
spiritual; they are not natural nor temporal, neither carnal nor sensual.
Doctrine & Covenants 29:34–35.
65. Consider, for example, the LDS word of wisdom, which gives temporal rules
regarding substances that should and should not be consumed. See Doctrine & Covenants 89.
Yet, the Church teaches that even these apparently temporal commandments with clear
temporal benefits “are for our spiritual good.” See GOSPEL PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at 194–
95.
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The first step is to remember that just deserts retributivism
requires a just system of law to punish an offender for that
individual’s crimes—the specific offender must pay for his or her
66
offense. It is not simply that the broken law must be satisfied, but
that a just system will only permit satisfaction by the one who broke
the law. The offender has a fundamental and personal right to be
punished because of the exercise of free will that resulted in the
67
offense. To deny that punishment, no matter the benevolent or
merciful reasons that may seem to exist to do so, is to deny the
offender’s personhood. The next step is to remember that all earthly
68
aspects are a type of those spiritual. What lessons can be gleaned
from retributivist theories of punishment? The primary lesson is that
each offender must satisfy the demands of justice for his or her own
offenses. The spiritual corollary would be that if all of us personally
must suffer the punishment for our crimes then we must do so for
our sins as well. It is not difficult to see what follows. If we must
each pay the price of our own sins, then the Savior could not have
done it for us; it would not have been possible for him to do so. Any
atonement will have been of null effect, so why look to it and to the
Lord for our salvation? The inevitable lesson would be that salvation
is impossible.
Because we are not perfect and our hands are not clean, it is not
possible for any of us to pay the price for our own sins. If we do not
repent and avail ourselves of the Savior’s atonement, we cannot
become exalted because a metaphorical price for those transgressions
must be paid, but our own unclean hands cannot pay it. That is what
the doctrines of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints teach
69
regarding the need for a Savior and for his infinite atonement.
Just deserts retributivism demands that people must be punished
for their crimes to satisfy justice. In the end, because just deserts
retributivism is fundamentally inconsistent with the doctrine of the
atonement and its primacy in the plan of salvation, the notion that

66. See Gardner, supra note 2, at 862–70.
67. Id.
68. See Doctrine & Covenants 29:34–35, in which the Lord reveals that he has never
given us temporal laws and that all things are spiritual unto him. In explaining the performance
of the ordinances of the gospel for the dead, the Lord explains in an aside that “that which is
earthly conform[s] to that which is heavenly.” Doctrine & Covenants 128:13–14.
69. See GOSPEL PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at 73.
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punishment is required for the sake of punishment alone cannot be
70
demanded, and may not even be permitted, by LDS philosophy.
IV. CONCLUSION
In his essay purporting to examine the criminal sanction through
LDS thought, Professor Gardner does not give more than a passing
mention to the doctrine of the atonement, let alone explain how the
just deserts retributivism model for punishment could be reconciled
with it. This omission is quite glaring in an essay that has as its goal
the analysis of the criminal sanction from a LDS perspective. Given
the obvious parallels between laws and commandments, crime and
sin, punishment and consequences, and rehabilitation and
redemption, Professor Gardner’s failure to address the atonement, to
explain or explain away its effect on LDS thought regarding secular
justice given its preeminence in divine justice, leaves his proof of
LDS support for just deserts retributivism incomplete, and ultimately
unconvincing.

70. The commandments, teachings, and counsel provided by LDS doctrine must teach
spiritual principles consistent with the plan of salvation. To the extent that retributivist ideals
are inconsistent with those principles and would tend to teach the futility of repentance, and
even of the atonement of itself, just deserts retributivism would be antithetical to LDS
doctrine.
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